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ABSTRACT
In this chaptel;
ji-mnework .for
for corporate envirol1
environ
chapte}; a legitimacy
legilin-zacy theory ji-OJneHJOrk
mental
/Ising a nlu/ri-case
multi-case research
n1entaJ disclosure is empirically
en1pirically investigated, llsing
design. Legitimation
of t\1JO
two
anl1ual reporTs
reports qf
Legitilnation strategies in the 1991
/991 to 1995 annual
Canadian-owned
companies are explored. 7/le
The findings
Can.adian-o'vvned pulp and paper co}npanies
support legitimacy
Fir voluntary envirOJ1.nulnlol
environmental
legithnacy theory as an explanation .{or
disclosu re in annual reports.
disclosure

INTRODUCTION
elnpirically investigates a legitilnacy
This chapter empirically
legitimacy theory franlework
framework for
voluntary environmental disclosure in annual reports. A nlulti-case
multi-case research
llsed to identify legitimation
legitinlation strategies in the annual reports of two
design is used
Canadian-owned pulp and paper c0111panies
companies over a five-year
live-year period. The
primary
prinlary objective is to determine
detennine whether voluntary disclosures of environ
ll1ental information
infornlation in annual reports are strategic attenlpts
mental
attempts to counter perceived
challenges of organizational legitinlacy,
legitimacy, arising fronl
from
extant or potential chaJlenges
corporate activities impacting the natural envirorul1ent.
environment.
econolnic theories have been used in attenlpts
attempts to
Decision-usefulness and economic
explain voluntary corporate social disclosure (CSD), but have generally proved

restrictive
aI., 1995a;
et aI.,
a!., 1987, 63-90,
restriclive and unsatisfactory (Gray et a1.,
] 995a~ Gray el
1988; Mathews,
2-4, 1998; Preston, 1975; Puxty, 1986; Savage, 1998).
Mathe\vs, 1993,
1993,2-4,
mold (1990) posits that the field of CSD is devoid of any substantive,
A
Arnold
rnold
theoretical foundation, and Ullmann
(1985,
Ulln1ann (]
985, 555) describes CSD as "empirical
data in search of an adequate theory." This chapter attelnpts
attempts to further develop
and provide empirical
framework.
ernpirical support for an underlying theoretical fran1e\Vork.
A possible explanation for the increasing phenornenon
phenomenon of voluntary CSD is
legitimacy (see Gray et aI.,
a!., 1995a;
the corporate quest for organizational legilin1acy
Hogner,
rlogner, 1982;
] 982; Mathews,
Mathe\\.'s, 1993, 217; Patten, 1991, 1992; Puxty, ]1986;
986;
Richardson, 1987; Savage, 1998; Tinker &
& Lovv'e,
Lowe, 1980). A
A state of legitinlacy
legitimacy
is attained when societal perceptions of corporate behavior are congruent with
societal expectations of corporate [environmental]
lenvironnlentalJ activity (Dowling & Pfeffer,
legitimation
al1empts to
1975). To achieve this state,
state~ legitirnation strategies are used in attenlpts
justify
corporate
coexistence
with
society.
justiCy
\vith society'.
Although one accounting study involving an A
Australian
ustralian corporation failed to
support a legitimacy
]egitinulcy theory framework
rrarnework (Guthrie & Parker, 1989), at least seven
studies have successfully used a conceptual definition of legitinlacy
legitimacy theory to
explain CSD in annual reports (Hogner,
1982; Guthrie &
& Parker, 1990; Patten,
(Hagner, 1982:
1992;
1992~ Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Deegan & Rankin, 1996, 1997; Buhr, ]1998).
998).
rneasures of legitilnacy.
None of these identify measures
legitimacy. There is no satisfactory
alternative or competing
phenomenon of voluntary CSD,
c0l11peting theory to explain the phen0l11enOn
although
theories, stakeholder theory and pol
political
aJ though two
t Vv'O complementary
conlp]ernentary theories.
i tical
eCOn0l11Y theory, have been identified
1995a~ Buhr, 1998).
economy
identilied (Gray et aI.,
a!., 1995a;
a!. (1998), exan1ined
examined 33 public
An eighth study, conducted by Neu et a1.
cornpanies over a ten-year period (1982 to 1991), operating in four
companies
"environnlentally-sensitive' industries. Six of these firn1s
'environmentally-sensitive'
firms were in the pulp and
T'heir regression tTIodel
paper industry. Their
model used an environmental issues-based
annual report word count as the dependent variable and exalnined
examined its relation
to seven independent variables. Three of the independent variables exan1ined
examined
the frequencies of: (I) articles addressing environnlentally-based
environmentally-based fines
(FINES), (2) general environmental criticisn1s
(FfNES),
criticisms (MEDIA), and (3) published
Canadian newspaper and periodical articles (SOCIETY). The predicted signs
or significant
signi ficant (at the Il % level) coefficients for these indep'endent
of
independent variables were
;assu111cd' or not fully developed in the paper, and were also not
either 'assumed'
consistent in direction.
consistenl
'The present study also focuses on FINES, MEDIA and SOCIETY variables,
The
does so on a di fferent dimension,
dinlension, and is based on the assulnption
but c10es
assumption that the
technology does not presently exist to perforn1
perform quantitative analyses on
legit irnacy theory 111otivation
motivation for corporate envirol11nental
environmental disclosure. There
st ud y uses a structured case study approach to ex
alnine
Core, It his ex p lanatory study
examine

corporate environmental
which is the fastest growing fornl
form of CSD
environrnental disclosure, \vhich
(Gray, 1993, 1994; Gray et al.,
aI., 1993, 181, 1995a). Adverse 111edia
media reports are
used as an indirect 111easure
measure of legitinlacy
legitimacy (see Savage, 1998). The results are
consistent with
\vith the hypothesis.
The next Section presents a synopsis of the theory. Section III describes the
research design. Section IV presents the case evidence and Section V specifies
the limitations.
nnal Section concludes the study.
j in1itations. The final

LEGITIMACY
LEGI1"IMACY THEORY FRAMEWORK
Savage (1998) provides an extensive literature review and an organizational
environmental disclosure
legitimacy
legitilllacy theory framework
franlework to explain corporate environnlental
from
terms of legiti111acy
legitimacy theory, organizations
fronl a social contract perspective. In ternlS
atten1pt to establish congruence between the social values associaLed
attempt
associated \vith
with or
implied
norms and values of the
inlplied by their [environmental]
[environlnentalJ activities, and the nOrI11S
\vhich they are part (Dov./ling
(Dowling & Pfe1ler,
Pfeffer, 1975). I'hey
They do this by using
society of which
legitinlation strategies to justify their coexistence \vith
legitimation
with the public-at-Iarge and
econornic pursuits, \vhich
which provides for their long-ternl
long-term
to continue their economic
survival. If this balance is even perceived to be disturbed, a legitinlacy
legitimacy gap
]egitin1acy is difficult to n1easure.
arises. But, legitimacy
measure.
media reports are indicators of societal
Savage (1998) argues that nevvs
news I1ledia
nor1115 and values, and provides references for this position froln
norms
from the sociology,
organizational theory, and accounting literature streanlS.
streams. Based on this, if a
perceived threat to the larger collective social interest arises because of the
legitimacy of the organization and/or its industry
actions of an organization, the ]egitinlacy
will be challenged in the news 111edia,
media, in the fornl
form of
of' adverse news n1edia
media
media report is defined
delined as one that reflects negatively
reports. An adverse news 111edia
environn1ental activities of the cOll1pany.
on the environmental
company. Once a legitirnacy
legitimacy gap has been
identified by one or 1110re
more adverse 111edia
media reports, and organizational Jegit.in1acy
legitimacy
combination, of legitilllation
legitimation
challenged, corporations would select one, or a c0J11binatioIl,
strategies to close the existing or perceived legitinlacy
legitimacy gap. The 111agnitude
magnitude or
of
a legitimacy
legjlirnacy gap would be reflected by the nUl1lber
of
adverse
rnedia
reports
number
media
giving rise to the gap. Because the annual reports of public corporations are
generally accepted as a channel of COlllll1unication
communication to interested 111enlbers
members of
society, they represent a logical (but not the sole) 111ediuJ11
for
legitinlation
medium
legitimation
con1111unications (for support of this position, see Deegan & Rankin,
related communications
1995~ Robertson &
1997,580; Flinn, 1995;
& Nicolson, 1996).
Environrnental legitimation
legitin1ation is therefore a dynanlic,
Environmental
dynamic, cyclical process of
continuing societal appraisal of corporate environn1entaI
environmental activities in ternlS
terms of
nornlS and values. If a legitiluacy
prevailing norms
legitimacy gap is perceived, adverse nledia
media

reponing
legitimacy, a
reporting will
wiJl fol1ow.
follow. On perceiving a threat to organizational legitin1acy,
corporation will invoke one or more strategies to close the gap. C0l111TIUnication
Communication
to society will
medium. The next
wi,II then take place, with the annual report as one 111ediulTI.
section describes the various legitimation
may
legitilllation strategies that a corporation inay
choose to employ.
Legitimation
Legitilnation Strategies

The organizational
legitimation strategies.
organizationaJ theory literature identifies nine legitilTIation
Consistent with
method enlployed,
employed, three additional strategies were
vv'ith the research 111ethod
identified during the course of this study. The three new contributions to the
accounting literature are not pre-specified, but are included in this section for
legitimation strategies l11ay
may be
completeness
cOJllpleteness and ease of reference only. The 12 legitin1ation
classified into two broad categories of legitimation activity. These are:
(l)�
(J) Substantive
Substan1ive activity:2 This category involves real, material change to
organizational goals, structures and processes, or in socially institution
alized practices. Society generally
general]y favors concrete, substantive responses
& Gibbs, 1990; Suchman,
Suchlnan, 1995).
(Ashforth &
activity:] This category does not involve real changes, but
(2) Symbolic
SYlnbolic activity:}
(2)�

altempts
compatible with societal norn1S
norms
atten1pts to portray corporate activities as c0I11patible
& Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer,
PfetTer, 1981, 28). Managenlent
Management
and values (Ashforth &
syn1bolic assurances,
assurances) since they are more econol11ica]
generally favors symbolic
economical and
flexible than substantive actions.
rrhe 12
J 2 strategies are classified and defined below. Ashforth & Gibbs (1990)
The
bstantive and first six syInbolic
ofler an in-depth discussion on the three su
substantive
symbolic
strategies. The Jast three symbolic strategies elnerged
emerged fronl
from the enlpirical
empirical work
cOIllpleted in this study.
completed

Substantive Strategies
(1) Role perj'ormance:
jJel:/orI11.once: The lnost
(I)�
most obvious attelnpt
attempt at legitill1ation
legitimation is where the

organization adapts its goals, 111ethods
methods of operation, and/or
andlor its output to
confornl to the performance
perfornlance expectations of the Inen1bers
conform
members of society on
\VhOlTI it depends for critical resources (Dowling &
whom
& Pfeffer, 1975). This
strategy could be chosen in response to a legitilnacy
legitimacy gap resulting from
perfonnance failure by the organization (Lindblom, cited by Gray et
actual performance
aI., 1995a, 54), or where perfornlance
performance expectations are determined by
a!.,
lnarket, normative,
norn1ative, legal or political forces, and fulfihnent
market,
fulfilment of these
expectations is essential for survival.

(2)�
more subtle, evolutionary legitin1ation
legitimation
(2) Coercive isomorphism:
iS0J110rphisrn: This is a 1110re
process (DiMaggio &
& Po\vell,
Powell, 1983;
& Ro\van,
Rowan, 1977). It is
1983~ Meyer &
manifested
time, of evolving societal norn1S
norms and values
nlanifested by a blending, over tin1e,
into an organizational structure, signaling t.he
the willingness and ability of the
organization to conform
con1'orn1 to society's collective values. The organization
becomes
'matched' with its cultural environlnent,
environment, by
beC0l11eS substantively 'Illatched'
employing
from Syll1bolic
symbolic strategies to
enlploying substantive strategies or by shifting froll1
substantive strategies over t.inle.
time. This st.ructurally
structurally legitill1ate
legitimate organization
becomes
public confidence (Meyer &
& Ro\van,
Rowan, 1977;
becon1es a repository of pubJic
Suchman,
Suchll1an, 1995).
(3) Altering
/i./tering socially institurh)nalized
0)�
institutionalized practice,s':
practices: l~he
The organization could
anempt,
communication, to alter the societal definition of
atten1pt, through C0l111nUnication,
legitimacy,
amended definition reflects the organization's
legitin1acy, so that the an1elH.ied
activities. This is the 1110St
most difficult strategy to successfully inlplenlcnt
implement
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975).

Sy/nbolic
Symbolic Strategies
( I) Espousing socially accejJtable
(I)�
acceptable goals: The organization Inay
may advocate

(2)
(2)�

(3)
(3)�

(4)

(5)
(6)
(6)�

socially acceptable goals while pursuing less acceptable ones. It 111ay,
may, for
exaI11ple, disclose ethical policies, but fail to in1plell1ent
example,
implement procedures to
nl0nitor compliance.
c0111pliance.
monitor
conceabnent: The organization I11ay
Denial and concealment:
may sinlply
simply deny or suppress
inforl11ation about activities that 111ay
information
may undernline
undermine legitiI11acy.
legitimacy.
Identification 'rvith
with sylnbols,
symbols, values or institutions: The organization could
attenlpt to become
beconle identified with synlbols,
aHempt
symbols, values or institutions v.;ith
with a
975).
strong, established base of sociallegitilnacy
social legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, ]1975).
Ojjering accounts: The organization 111ay
Offering�
may offer explanations, including
excuses and justifications, designed to distance the organization fronl
from
situations adversely affecting its legitinlacy.
legitimacy.
Qflering apologies:�
Ll]Jologies: By apologizing, an organization Illay
Ojfering
may show S0l11e
some
relTIOrSe for a negative event.
expression of remorse
Ceren1.onial conformity:
conjorn-lity: Certain highly visible and salient practices that are
Ceremonial
consistent with social expectations 111ay
may be adopted, while leaving the
forInal structure of the organization intact. For exalnple,
formal
example, scapegoating, or
fonnation of a task force to study the environnlental
the formation
environmental inlpacts
impacts of
rnay provide the appearance of action without the substance
activities, may
(Pfeffer, 1981).
The next three strategies represent a new contribution to the fran1ework,
framework,
and resulted [roln
from the enlpirical
empirical component of this study.

(7)�
of guilt: By adnlitting
admitting guilt, an organization
organization 111ay
may ackno\vledge
acknowledge
(7) Admission qf
at least
event, in
in an
an attelnpt
attempt to
to diffuse
diffuse
leasL partial responsibility for a negative event,
impression and/or
andlor reality
reality of
of honesty.
honesty.
the situation by creating the inlpression
misinterpretation: The
The organization
organization 111ay
may
(8)�
(8) Misrepresentation
Misrepre . .;entation or open to l11.isinterpretation:
intentionally or unintentionally give
glve a false ilTIpression
impression or
or account,
account, or
or
supply ambiguous infonnation
information that could be
be lTIisleading
misleading or
or open
open to
to
n1 i si n te rpretati on.
misinterpretation.
trivializing� or skirting around the issue:
(9) Avoiding, trivializing
issue: The
The organization
organization 111ay
may
directly address
address an
an issue.
issue. l'lhe
The
offer a partial explanation, trivialize or fail to directly
infornlation l11ay
information
may not be clearly conveyed or Illay
may si111ply
simply be
be inlplied.
implied.

HYJ)othesis
Hypothesis DeveLoJ)Jnent
Development
One of the pri lnary
mary lTIoti
moti vations that the concept of
of organizational
organizational legitinlacy
legitimacy
management is COn1111Unication
communication with society.
society. In
In this
this study,
study, itit isis
has for 111anagelnent
of the
the
environmental disclosure in annual
annual reports
reports isis part
part of
hypothesized that environnlental
of
the
degree
of
'fit
corporate legitilnation
process,
which
is
indicative
legitimation
indicative of the degree of 'fit'\
between societal expectations and organizational activities
activities (Zenisek,
(Zenisek, 1979).
1979). We
We
argue that, if an organization voluntarily discloses environn1enta]
environmental infonnation
information
in its annual report, then this disclosure is a syn1bolic
symbolic or
or substantive
substantive strategic
strategic
attenlpt to counter perceived existing or potential challenges
challenges to
to its
its legitin1acy,
attempt
legitimacy,
arising fron1
from corporate (industry-related and/or
andlor conlpany-specific)
company-specific) activities
activities
specitlcaIly, and
and incorporating
incorporating an
an
environment. More specifically,
affecting the natural environn1ent.
indirect nleasure
of
legitinlacy,
the
research
hypothesis
is:
hypothesis is:
measure
legitimacy,
If ai.l company
c0l11pany has
If
has an
an iten1
item of
of voluntary
voluntary cl1vironnlental
cnvironmental disclosure
disclosure in
in its
its annual
annual report.
rcport. then
then
is aa legitin1atiol1
this is
legitimation strategy
strategy llsed
used to
to respond
respond to
to recorded
recorded societal
societal nOrl11S
norms and
and values
values and/or
and/or
this
legitinlllcy gapts)
legitimacy
gap(s) arising
arising froll)
from adverse
adverse news
news Inedia
media reports
re[lOrlS targeting
targeting the
thc C0111pany
company and/or
<md/or
the industry
industry in
in which
which itit operates.
operates.
the

con1pany \vishes
If aa company
wishes to extend or 111aintain
maintain its
its legilin1acy
legitimacy via
via its
its annual
annual report,
report,
it will respond to societal nOrI11S
norms and values only. If
If itit wishes
wishes to
to defend
defend its
its
legitilllacy,
it
wi]J
respond
to
actual
legiti111acy
gap(s)
or
to
a
combination
of
legitimacy,
wiJl
legitimacy gap(s) or to a combination of
societ.al nornlS
societal
norms and
and values
values and
and legitirnacy
legitimacy gaps.
gaps.
Before focusing on research that atten1pts
attempts to explain
explain or
or predicl
predict the
the use
use of
of any
any
specific legiti111ation
support
specific
legitimation strategy,
strategy, it
it is
is essential
essential to
to first
first provide
provide elnpirical
empirical support
for the
the hypothesis
for
hypothesis that
that corporate
corporate atten1pts
attempts at
at legitilnation
legitimation are
are indeed
indeed the
the
underlying cause
That is
is the
the purpose
purpose of
of
underlying
cause for
for voluntary
voluntary envirol1111ental
environmental disclosure.
disclosure. That
this study.
study.
this

RESEARCH DESIGN
This explanatory study exal11ines
examines the forces underlying voluntary environ
mental disclosure in annual reports. Yin's (1989) 111ulti-case
multi-case research design is
111ental
llsed to investigate the hypothesis. I-lis
used
His book has becoll1e
become a standard reference
Spicer. 1995). Consistent \\.,Iith
with
for case study research design (Colbert & Spicer,
Colbert & Spicer (1995, 430), \\.JC
we believe that Yin provides the clearest
clearest and
n10st coherent and cOlllprehensive
most
comprehensive approach to I11ulti-case
multi-case explanatory
research.
prin1ary objective of Yin
~s approach is TO
The primary
Yin's
lO provhle
provide oJ7olyrico!
anu/wical e\'idence
('\'idence
en1.pirical validit.v
0/ the underlying Iheor.v,
theory, by rnatching
matching case
about the empirical
validity 0.1'
evidence back to theory, and not to generaliz.e
generalize fronl
from a san1ple
sample to a larger
21). The pre-specified theory is "used as a ten1plate
population (Yin, 1989,
1989,21).
template \\lith
with
conlpare the en1pirical
which to compare
empirical results of the case study" (Yin, 1989, 38). ItIt
needs to state the conditions under \~/hich
which a particular phenolnenon
phenomenon rcorporate
[corporate
envirol1111ental reporting
environmental
reporting]1 will generally be found l"\vhen
lwhen an extant or possible
legitinlacy gap is perceived] and the conditions V\lhen
future legitimacy
when it is not
not likely to
be found I\vhen no existing or possible future gap is perceived] (Yin, j1989,
989, 54).
54).
This characteristic has a profound effect
etfect on the selection of the cases to be
be
investigated, whIch
which are chosen specifically because they exhibit S0I11e
some identified
general theoretical principle, and not by llleans
means of a san1pling
sampling 111ethod
method that
that
ensures no bias.
Following Yin (1989), the researcher seeks ~'to
"to specify the necessary
necessary
anlong a set of theoreticaJ1y-signl/icaJ11
conditions among
theoretically-significant elenlents,~'
elements," and is not
satis1ied with explanations for 1110s1
most of the variance in the data, but seeks to
satisfied
explain all the data. Deviant cases are llsed
used as opportunities to refine the
analysis so that the relationships described "have been analytically induced
induced
frOID the data" (Silvern1an,
(Silverman, 1989, 62-63). If the oulcon1e
outcome of a case is not as
as
from
predicted~
the
theory
nlust
be
1110di
ned
(Yin,
1989,
54).
In
this
111anner,
theory
predicted,
must
modi fled
manner, theory
developInent takes place. Consistent with this, the enlpirical
development
empirical findings in this
study resulted in an extension to the theory, in the fornl
form of three neVi
new syrnbolic
symbolic
legitinlation
strategies.
These
were
(1)
(f{bnission
(~r
guilt,
(2)
/l1isrepresenlolion
legitimation
(I) admission 0/
misrepresentLl!ion
or open !O
lO lnisinterpretatiol1,
misinterpretation, and (3) avoichng,
avoiding, rrivializing,
trivializing, or skirring
skirting around
around
the
Ihe issue.
Selection q{
0/ Cases and DOCUIJ1ents
Documents

Two of Canada's largest wood products conlpanies
companies were investigated over a
five-year period (199]
to
1995).
Additional
cases would be helpful, but the
(1991
researcher should avoid thinking in ternlS
of
the
'~snlall
terms
"small sanlple
sample size of cases"
cases"

Yin (1989,
from a salnple
sample to a
(] 989, 38-39),
38-39)l as the intention is not to generalize fron1
larger population, but to provide analytical evidence about the empirical
validity of the theory (Colbert &
& Spicer, 1995).
] 995).
Selection o(
o.f Companies. Consistent with previous empirical findings on CSD
practices and their relevance to legitimacy theory (Savage, 1998), two
corporations were selected within the following paran1eters:
parameters:
(I)�
minimize the
(J) Canadian-owned, with annual reports issued in Canada, to nlinirnize
norms and values.
effects of differences in international societal nonns
(2) Publicly conspicuous, due to their size.
(3)�
impacts are central and pervasive
(3) In an industry where environmental inlpacts
companies
features
fealures of organizational economic
econonlic activity. Resource-based c01l1panies
generally have a significant impact
environment and have the
ilnpact on the natural environnlent
greatest likelihood
media coverage. Using
likeIihood of receiving adverse news lnedia
companies
cOlllpanies from
fran1 resource-based industries is consistent with prior environ
1994,85;
& Freedn1an,
Freedman, 1996).
mental reporting research (Buhr, 1994,
111ental
85; Buhr &
Therefore, the selected companies
(1) Canadian-o\vned
Canadian-owned and listed on the
cOlllpanies were: (])
Toronto
companies in their industry, based on
'Toronto Stock Exchange, (2) the largest cOlnpanies
1994 operating revenue,
companies in Canada's
revenue~ and (3) resource-based. Two conlpanies
pulp and paper industry were selected. They were MacMillan Bloedel Ltd
(MB)
eM B) and Domtar
DOlntar Inc. This resource-based industry was chosen because:
(I)�
environmental problelTIs
problems
(I) It is widely
\videly recognised as having significant environnlental
(Adarns, 1992;
1992~ Foot, 1996; Freedman
Freedlnan & Jaggi, 1988;
] 988; Wiseman, 1982).
(Adams,
(2) Internationally, this industry is the Inost
most prolific discloser of envirol1tllental
environmental
infonnation (Buhr, 1994, iv;
iv~ Fekrat et aI., 1996; Niskala & Pretes~
information
Pretes, 1995;
Econolnic and Social Council 1992).
] 992).
United Nations Economic
6, 1993, p. A8),
AS),
(3)�
(3) According to a report in the Winnipeg
H1innipeg Free Press (June 6~
enLitled 'Forestry industries top poll's watch-closely list', Canada's pulp
entitled
and paper industry continues to hold the distinction of the industry that
governn1ents to keep the cl<?sest
people want governments
closest watch on. This is consistent
\vith other 1991,
]991, 1992
]992 and 1993 poll results.
with
(4) As Canada's largest industry, pulp and paper has long been the backbone
(4)�
eCOnOJll)'. The industry's contribution to Canada's trade balance is
of its economy.
con1bined contributions of the 111ining,
larger than the combined
mining, petroleUl11,
petroleum, fisheries,
1997~ Orton, 1991; Rusk, 1992;
1992~
and agriculture industries (Gordon, 1997;
Sherbano\vski, 1991).
Sherbanowski,
Selection of
q{ Nel1/s
Media
News Mpdia
environn1ental
actions
of the
environmental
fr0l11 the Canadian
selected from

Reports. English newspaper reports about the
cOlllpanies for the]
991 to 1995
j 995 fiscal years were
companies
the 1991
Business and CUtTent
CUITent Affairs (CBCA) database

employees of the selected
(1996). Articles or press releases not originated by ernployees
companies were used, as the intention \vas
was to exarnine
examine public legitin1acy
legitimacy
c0111panies
challenges,
companies' response to these challenges via the nevv's
news
challenges~ and not the con1panies'
media. The news report selection process was perforn1ed
performed by a graduate research
n1edia.
compared.
assistant, replicated by the principal researcher, and the results cOlnpared.

Proceduresf(Jr
Procedures
f()r Data Collection and Analysis
legitimacy theory to explain
The general analytic strategy was the use of legitin1acy
environmental disclosure.
corporate environnlental
was docun1ent
document analysis. Data
Data collection
collection.. The data collection technique \~/as
(I) environnlental
environmental disclosure in
for the 1991 to 1995 fiscal years consisted of: (1)
companies and in environn1ental
environmental reports referred to in
the annual reports of the c0l11panies
the annual reports; (2) recorded Canadian environnlental
environmental norn1S
norms and values; and
media, which illlplied
implied negative industry-related
(3) events reported in the news lTIedia,
company-specific environnlental
environmental actions. The data collection proceeded as
and cOlnpany-specific
follows.
(1)) l\t1B,
MB, (2) Donltar
Domtar and (3) the pulp and paper industry, separate
Step 1. For (I
media reports were prepared,
chronological descriptive lists of adverse news 111edia
using the CBCA database as a source of reference. The lists were used as a
source for collecting copies of the actual reports. Copies of the reports were
summarize actual or perceived legitinlacy
legitimacy gaps, over the
used to identify and SUlTIlnarize
From the analysis of the content of 164
media reports
five-year period. Fronl
] 64 adverse I11edia
mentioned by nanle
name as the perpetrator of danlaging
damaging
in which MB was n1entioned
environmental acts, 63 legitinlacy
legitimacy gaps \vere
were distilled. For 00n1tar,
Domtar, 44 adverse
environlnental
media reports gave rise to 34 legitin1acy
legitimacy gaps. For the industry, 145 news
nledia
legitimacy gaps. (Appendix C gives exanlples
examples of S0l11e
some or
or
reports resulted in 48 legitin1acy
the MB gaps).
norms and values, as they related to
Step 2. A listing of Canadian societal Banns
environment, was prepared. These were doclunented
documented
protection of the natural environnlent,
(I) polling experts (i
(i.e.
environmental 1literature,
by (1)
.e. Gallop Poll), (2) the environn1ental
iterature, and (3)
major governn1ent
government initiatives. 4
as evidenced by 111ajor
company, all environnlental
environmental disclosures in the annual
Step 3. For each cOlnpany,
reports, and in separate environnlental
environmental reports referred to in the annual reports,
measured, and recorded, by fiscal year, using content analysis
were identified, I11easured,
a!., 1995a, 1995b). The categories listed in
(see Buhr, 1994,98-110;
1994, 98-110; Gray et aI.,
Appendix A were used. These were supplemented
supp]en1ented by subcategories to refine
the analysis. The coding proceeded as follows: Annual reports were read in
information was coded by a graduate
their entirety and each unique piece of infornlation
document basis. This process was
research assistant on a document by docun1ent

conducted 1I1
In accordance with specific coding guidelines, devised by Buhr
(1994, 346-348), and adapted for this study. These guidelines appear in
Appendix B. Completed worksheets distinguished between voluntary and
mandatory
mandatory
111andatory disclosure,
disclosure according to Canadian GAAP, so that 111andatory
disclosure could be excluded. The procedure was independently replicated by
the principal researcher,
researcher and the results compared.
cornpared.
The
T'he purpose of this step was threefold. First, a common
C01111110n language of cross
case concepts was generated (Miles, 1979),
] 979), providing the structure for
cross-case comparisons.
environmental
cOlnparisons. Second, it ensured that all voluntary environnlental
disclosure was examined
exarnined in the context of legitimacy
legitilnacy theory, as opposed to an
examination
exanlination of only the environmental
environnlcntal data that fit the theory. Third, the coding
was independently replicated,
repl icated, and the completeness
cOlnpleteness and reliability of the
results were enhanced.
Step 4. Using the coding worksheets as a reference, each itern
item of
environmental
environnlent::d disclosure was comprehensively
c0I11prehensively described.�
described.
1

l

Dow
matched�
!Jola analysis: All items
itelTIS of voluntary environmental
envirOllrnental disclosure were Inatched
with
were used for analysing
analysing�
\vith specific legitimation
legitin1ation strategies. Three techniques vv'cre
the evidence:�
evidence:
(I)�
Pattern-lnatching: An empirical
enlpirical pattern is compared
cOlnpared with a predicted
(1) Pattern-matching:

pattern, following the theoretical propositions of the franlev./ork.
framework. In
explanatory studies, the patterns may
be
related
to
the
dependent
[i.e.
Inay
environmental
legitimation strategiesJ
strategies] and
environnlental disclosures in the form
forn1 of legitinlation
independent [i.e. recorded societal nonl1S
norms and values, adverse news 111edia
media
reports and legitimacy
legitinlucy gaps]
gapsJ variables. If the patterns coincide,
coincide~ the internal
validity of the study is strengthened (Yin,
(Yin~ 1989, 108-109).
(2)�
(2) Explanation-building: This is used
llsed primarily
prinlarily for explanatory case studies.
The objective is to build a general explanation that fits each of the
individual cases, even though the details of the individual cases may vary
(Yin, 1989,
1989, 113-114).
I 13-1 14).
(3) Time-series
'rinle-series analysis: There are different types of tinle-series
(3)�
time-series analyses (Yin,
1989, 115-120). The type called ·chronologies'
'chronologies' best suits this study. The
cOlnpare the chronology \vith
analytical objective is to compare
with that predicted by
some
where the theory has
SOllle explanatory theory [i.e. legitimacy
legitinlacy theory], \vhere
son1e events 111
list always occur before other events [i.e. an
specified that some
must
extant or perceived legitimacy
environmental
legiriIl1acy gap must
Illust occur before environnlental
place], with
\vith the reverse sequence not being an option.
disclosure takes place),
Consistent with the analytical techniques, the operational procedure for the
cornpany was to 'pattern-match'
'pattern-111atch' the content of each iten1
item
data analysis of each company
environnlcntal disclosure with the content of adverse Inedia
of environmental
media reports

preceding issuance of the annual report. Fron)
From this detailed analysis, specific
specifIc
legitimation strategies could be identified. (Appendix C gives exan1ples
examples fron1
from
the MB case.) If aJ]
a]] environn1ental
environmental disclosure could be panern-Inatched
panern-matched to a
legitimation
manner, the hypothesis vvould
would be supported.
legitin1ation strategy in this 111anner,
The initial case \vas
was MB. The f1ndings
findings were c0111pared
compared against the
the
hypothesis,
with the
the
hypothesis~ using the explanation-building technique. Consistent \\lith
research methodology,
was analysed independently. Then, i:la
nlethodology, the second case \vas
cross-case con1parison
was the final stage of the
comparison was conducted, which \vas
from the
replication process. The objective was to draw cross-case conclusions froIll
manner of presentation resulted
resulted in
results of the individual cases. However, this 111anner
a lengthy, repetitious discussion of results. Thus, consistent \vith
with the approach
adopted by Colbert & Spicer (1995, 443-444), the evidence and findings for
both cases have been presented in a single section.

Reliabilitv
Validity.
. and Validjt)!
tw'o reliability issues: reliability in the collection of the dOCUl11ents
documents
There are two
(i.e. annual reports, news Jnedia
media reports and governn1ent
government publications), and
reliability in the analysis of each dOCUI11ent
document (recall that the data collection
document analysis). The extraction of the 111edia
media reports fron1
from the
the
technique is dOCUIl1ent
database was done by the graduate research assistant, and replicated by the
the
government reports presented no problen1
problem as they
principal researcher. The governnlent
were available upon request. No reliability problen1s
problems were encountered in Steps
summary
I and 3 of the data collection procedures, as the lists of events and the SU111nlary
of Canadian perforn1ance
performance expectations~
expectations, nOrl115
norms and values were purely
descriptive. This was I11erely
merely a recording procedure, devoid of subjective
decision-nlaking
and
researcher
bias.
decision-making
For analyzing each annual report~
report, the disclosure categories (Appendix A)
were used in a standardized n1anner~
manner, so that any researcher would categorize
(code) the data in the sanle
way
(Silvernlan,
same
(Silverman, 1993, 147-(48).
147-148). The coding was
done independently by two people, and the results conlpared.
compared.
Also, an evidentiary base was 111aintained,
maintained, so that the supporting dOCLllllenla
documenta
tion leading to the case conclusions (annual reports, database printouts, nledia
media
governlnent reports, coding vv'orksheets,
reports, government
worksheets, detailed analyses) would be
available for inspection. To further increase reliability, specific docun1en1.s
documents were
cited in the working papers, so thaL
that the evidentiary base, upon inspection,
98-1(3).
would reveal the evidence (Yin, 1989, 98-103).
Construct, internal and external validity issues vv'ere
were also addressed.
Construct validity was achieved by following specified data coJIection
collection
procedures, preparing worksheets detailing the results of the data collection

Yin's
and analysis, and cross-referencing (i.e. Yin
~s chain of evidence). Internal
pattern-matching, explanation-building, and
validity was addressed by using pattern-Inatching,
time-series analysis techniques. External validity is implicit in the I11ulti-case
multi-case
tiIlle-series
method, where replication logic is used.
study Inethod,
summarizes the stages of data collection
coJJection and data analysis, and
Table I] sUlnmarizes
shows how the reliability and validity issues were addressed.

CASE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS
oj" Ca:'J'es
Cases
Description o.l
company, with 12886
MB, Canada's largest pulp and paper products cOlnpany,
enlployees,
employees, sales in excess of $5 billion, and total operating assets of $4.6

Table 1.
1able

Reliability and Validity of Data Collection and Analysis

Method
Method�

Reliability/Validity
ReliabilitylValidity

For Data Collection:
Collect adverse news 111edia
media reports. Prepare a chronological,
descriptive list for
I'm the industry and each case.

Replicate and C0l11pare
compare
dOCUI11entary
documentary
database.

Fr0l11
From Inedia
media reports,
reports. identify and list c0l11pany-specific
company-specific and
industry-specific legitinlacy
legitimacy gaps.

Cross-reference to 111cdia
media
reports.

Calcgorize
Categorize nonl1S
norms and values.
values.�

Maintain evidentiary
database.

Categorize
Categorile disclosure on coding worksheet. Measure and describe.
describe.�

Replicate and C0l11pare
compare
results.

reslllts~
results;

For Data Analysis:
1:::or
For each ilenl
item of disclosure,
disclosure. identify at least one legitil11ation
legitimation
strategy, by matching disclosure (the dependent variable) with:
((I)
I) calegories
categories of Canadian nonns
nm!11S and values (an independent
variable)
(JJ1d/or
1I/1(l/or

(2)
\2) legitinlacy
legitimacy gapes) (an independent variable).
----------_._--------------

Cross-referencing;
DOCUIllcnts
Documents cited;
Evidentiary database;
PatternPattern
- matching;
Pattern-matching;
Ex
pJanation-bui ld i ng;
Explanation-building;
Titne-series
Time-series analysis;
Replication logic.

billion for the 1995 fiscal year,
managed t\\'O
two n1il1ion
million hectares of productive
year~ nlanaged
timberlands,
which were in British Colunlbia.
Columbia. f\1B
MB is
tin1berlands, approximately
approxin1ately half of \vhich
Montreal and Vancouver stock exchanges
listed on NASDAQ and the Toronto, T\1ontreal
(MB Annual Report, 1995; MB Annual Statutory Report, 1991).
Domtar, a major
manufacturer of pulp, paper, packaging\
packaging,
n1ajor North American
An1erican I11anufacturer
and lumber,
throughout Canada and the U.S., ranks flrst
first
lUl11ber, with facilities situated throughollt
among
with 9503 ernployees,
employees, annual
anl0ng lumber
lun1ber producers in Eastern Canada, \vith
sales of $2.8 billion and total assets of $3.2 billion for the 1995 financial year.
Domtar
D0l11tar is listed on the Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver stock exchanges
(1994 and 1995 Annual Reports).
Tesr ql
of Hypothesis
Hyporhesis
Test

Detailed, descriptive analyses of the environn1ental
environmental disclosures contained in the
MB and Donltar
Domtar dernonstrate
demonstrate that the
1991 to 1995 annual reports of both tvlB
item of
findings were consistent with the hypothesis for each individual itenl
environn1ental disclosure. Each itenl
environmental
item of disclosure in the annual reports of each
company
matched with categories of norll1S
norms and values and/or legitinlacy
legitimacy
cOll1pany was 1l1atched
gaps, and the resultant
legitimation strategies were identified.
resultanllegitinultion
Major legitiJnocy
legirimacy problenls
problems
MacMillan Bloedel. Throughout the five-year period, MB experienced attacks
legililnacy. For 1993 through 1995, it received 1110re
on its legitimacy.
more direct adverse news
coverage than the industry (in ternlS
terms of nUlllber
number of industry-related adverse
ne\vs reports - see Table 2),
2)~ despite the industry's reputation as the worst
news
environn1ental offender in Canada.
environmental
MB's adverse 111edia
media reports resulted in the identification of 63 C0l11pany
company
legitinlacy gaps over the five-year period, versus 48 industry-related
specific legitimacy

Table 2.
Fiscal Year

Nun1ber
Number of Adverse Media Reports
MB

D0l11tar
Domtar

Industry

__._----

---------------------~------------~.

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Total:

17

27

32

20
50

]0
10
33
22
22
44

40

41
36

164

36
27
10
145
---------

main legitilTIacy
legitimacy problelTIS,
problems, derived fr0I11
from the content of adverse
gaps. MB's 111ain
media reports, were:
111edia
(l)� The decline of its public inlage
image and its perceived lack of concern for the
(1)
environment (criticisnl
(criticism - I11easured
measured in tenns
terms of nUlnber
number of adverse reports
environnlent
- peaked in 1993);
1993)~
(2)� A large nunlber
number of criJllinal
criminal convictions for illegal environnlental
environmental activities
(2)
(criticism began in 1993 and peaked in 1995);
(criticislll
I 995)~
(3)� Its
lts destructive, unsustainable forestry practices in British COIUl11bia
Columbia
(3)
(criticism peaked in 1993), and the resultant danlage
damage to sahnon
salmon and other
(criticislll
marine life habitals
habitats (with criticis111
criticism at its worst in 1993/94);
nlarine
(4)� Its unwillingness to change environnlentally
environmentally unfriendly processes and
(4)
(criticism peaked in 1993);
practices (criticisIl1
(5)� lts association with the Clayoquot Sound controversy. Public protests
(5)
remaining
against MB's logging activities, in one of the world's largest renlaining
temperate rainforest, resulted in 932 arrests. This was the largest
tracks of tenlperate
mass
act of civil disobedience in Canadian history, resulting in the largest I1lass
with
trial in the history of the w.estern world. Protesters were charged \vith
criminal conten1pt
contempt of court for defying a MB-induced injunction banning
crinlinaJ
demonstrations on cOI11pany
company work sites. The resulting 111edia
media reports
denlonstrations
most severe attack on MB's legitinlacy.
legitimacy. They clailTled
clairned that
represented the t11051
harassment and attenlpted
attempted intitnidation
intimidation of
MB was responsible for harasstnent
camp (MacIsaac
(MacJsaac
protesters. Over ]lO,OOO
0,000 supporters visited the protesters' canlp
& Chan1pagne,
Champagne, 1994). MB suffered severe and da111aging
damaging public critici5111,
criticism,
&
especially in 1993;
1993~
The Clayoquot Sound events led to boycotts and threats of boycotts of IVIB
MB
(6)� T'he
(6)
materially affect the company's
products, which could adversely and 111aterially
C0l11pany~s
linancial condition, earnings, liquidity and even its survival (attacks peaked
financial
during 1994/95); and
(7)�
major chlorine dioxide spill at MB's Powell River plant in 1994
] 994 caused
(7) A n1ajor
(criticism peaked in 1994).
extensive, deadly air and water pollution (criticisln
] 994).

Primarily
Pri
Inari Iy as a result of (5) and (6) above, MB appeared to be in the throes of
major legitin1acy
legitimacy crisis; the industry was in the saIne
same position. As the
a t11ajor
dominant firm
donlinanl
finn in the industry, MB contributed to this negative public
manner. Media criticisnl
criticism of the industry and MB
perception in a profound 111anner.
same report. Major industry legitin1acy
legitimacy gaps were:
frequently appeared in the sanle
efj~uent, poisoning fish and
(1)� Water and air pollution, caused by pulp 111i11
mill effluent,
(1)
human health. Pulp 11lills
mills were accused of discharging highly
endangering hU111an
from their chlorine-bleaching process, into the
toxic dioxins and furans, fronl

(2)�
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)
(5)�

environment. Markets began delnanding
demanding chlorine-free products (criticisnl
(criticism
environnlent.
peaked during 1991/92);
1991/92)~
A deterioration of reputation due to a perceived lack of concern for the
(criticism peaked in 1991, but renlained
environment (criticlSl1l
remained strong through
environnlent
1993);
1993):
An� unwillingness to change environnlentally
environmentally unfriendly processes and
An
mills (criticisln
(criticism peaked in 1992)~
1992);
practices, especially at pulp 111ills
Destructive, unsustainable practices, especial]
lating to [-'orest
especiall y re
relating
rorest nlanage
manage
ment in British COIUl11bia
Columbia (criticisrn
(criticism peaked in 1993). Poor logging and
111cnt
clear-cutting
clear-culling practices destroyed forest ecosystenls
ecosystems and danlaged
damaged SalI11011,
salmon,
marine life, bird and \vildlife
wildlife habitats (criticislll
(criticism peaked in 1993):
1993);
other rnarine
The threat of an international boycott of Canadian forest products in
(criticism \vas
was
retaliation for the industry's destructive logging practices (criticisnl
1110sL
most pronounced in 1994).

D0l11tar's
Domtar's worst year was 1991, \vith
with 27 'bad nevvs'
news' reports (see T'able
Table
2). Most of these related to land contarnination
contamination at old plant sites. T'here
There \vas
was a
ror 1993:
\993:
significant decline, to 10 reports, in 1992;
1992~ a further decline to three for
and for 1994 and 1995,
] 995, adverse cOIl1pany-specific
media reports stabilized at
at
company-specific I1ledia
only two reports respectively. The nun1ber
number of indusLry-related
industry-related reports rar
exceeded those targeting D0l11tar
Domtar directly. Therefore, the industry \vas
was
experiencing n10re
more of a legitil11acy
legitimacy problen1
problem than DOl1ltar.
Domtar. Donltar-specific
Domtar-specilic ~bad
'bad
news' reports resulted in the identification of 34 legi
tilnacy gaps, VS.
legitimacy
vs. 48
industry gaps. Donltar's
Domtar's 111ain
main problenls
problems were:

DOnlf(lI:
DomtLll:

(1)
(I)� Toxic land contanlination
contamination left behind at a nunlber
number or
of its old woocl
wood
preserving plants, and its apparent inability to restore these sites (the
subject of 26 of the 34 Donltar
Domtar legitin1acy
legitimacy gaps, with 21 originating in
1991)~ and
1991);
(2)
991, ]1993
993
(2)� Air and water pollution caused by its pulp l1lills
mills (six gaps, fr0l11
from ]1991,
and 1994).
Cross-case c0J11parisoJ1.
comparison. Don1tar's
Domtar's I11ajor
major concern \vas
was its inability to rell1edy
remedy
toxic land contan1ination,
contamination, despite governnlenl
government clean-up orders and threats of
legal action. Attacks on its legitin1acy,
legitimacy, though bitter, originated fron1
from the
c0111rnunities
communities in which the old plants were situated, and froBl
from governnlent
government
denlands
demands for renlediation.
remediation. The site contalnination
contamination danlaged
damaged the cOlllpany's
company's
reputation, but did not provoke international conden1nation,
condemnation, unlike the MB
Clayoquot Sound controversy. A nlore
more serious threat to DOHltar
Domtar was the call for
an international boycott of Canadian forest products, due to the industry's
destructive logging practices. DOTIltar
Domlar itself was not the subject of adverse
111edia
media reporting in this regard.

Generally, MB's legitimacy problelns
problems were far more serioLls
serious than D0111tar's,
Domtar's,
verse news reports, and \videspread
based on the number of ad
adverse
widespread condenlnation
condemnation of
of
MB '5 environmental actions. In particular, MB experienced a self-inflicted
MB's
self-inflicted
legitimacy 'crisis' (Clayoquot Sound), as opposed to D0l11tar's
self-inflicted
Domtar's self-inflicted
Jegitilnacy 'problem' (site contanlination).
legitimacy
contamination). In contrast to MB, DOH1tar's
Domtar's serious
serious
]egitinlacy concern, i.e. the call for an international boycott
forest
legitimacy
boycoll of Canadian forest
products, was industry-illlposed.
industry-imposed. The difference in intensity bet\veen
between these
these
study.
threats will be used to explain SOlne
some of the variations in the results of this study.
In this regard, Laughlin (1991) would argue that MB was subjected to nluch
much
larger exogenous shocks than 00111t41r.
Domtar.
Another difference was that MB's Blain
main legitin1acy
legitimacy threal
threat \vas
was not subject
subject to
to
111andatory
Domtar's was. Canadian
mandatory GAAP disclosure requirelnents,
requirements, while Don1tar's
Canadian
GAAP requires that future site restoration costs be recognized as a liability in
in
financial staten1cnts.
statements.
con1panies addressed all Inajor
Both companies
and
major legitinlacy
legitimacy gaps (coIllpany-specific
(company-specific and
industry-related) in their annual reports.
Patterns o.fMedia
o/Media Reports {[nd
al1d Disclosures

I). Adverse reports, specifically targeting MB,
MB,
MacMillan Bloedel (Fig. 1).
increased in 1992, peaked in 1993, and declined for both 1994 and 1995.
1995.
Adverse industry reports followed a silnilar
similar pattern, but with a one-year pre
pre
elnptive lag. For the post-1991 period, a pattern elnerges.
emptive
emerges.
MJ3 reacted sharply in its annual repo11s,
MB
rep0l1s, especially fronl
from 1993 through 1995,
1995,
for the
media reports exceeded those for
the
number of MB-specific adverse l11edia
when the nUI11ber
industry. ME
MB also introduced its 11rst
lirst separate environnlental
environmental report in 1993 and
and
devoted a significant anlount
escalating
elevated
amount of space to environnlental
environmental disclosure, escalating
7190/0
fronl 1992
) 992 (2.29 pages) to 1993 (18.76 pages). In 1994, both MB
719% from
MB
speci1~ic adverse 111edia
specific
media reports and disclosure started to decline. This trend
trend
continued through 1995.
Legitin1acy theory provides an explanation for these trends. The l1l0re
direct
Legitimacy
more direct
the adverse public reaction to its environmental activities, the 1110re
more MB
MB
atten1pted
to
defend
its
extant
legitill1i:lcy,
in
a
reactive
response
its
to
attempted
legitimacy,
its
industry-related
criticisl11
was
less
direct
and
less
urgent,
The
legitinlacy
crisis.
legitimacy
criticism
urgent,
hence the tilne
time lag in NIB's
MB's response to industry-related gaps. Figure 1I suggests
suggests
that the quantity of MB
~s disclosure was positively related to the nUI11ber
MB's
number of
of
adverse 111edia
adverse
media reports, for both c0l11pany-speciflc
company-specific and industry-related reports.
reports.
[)OJJ1far (Fig.
Domtar
(Fig. 2). The 00111t£1r
Domtar chart presents a very different fact pattern.
pattern.
criticism exceeded cOlllpany-specific
company-specific criticisITI
criticism throughout
the
Industry-related criticisI11
throughout the

five-year period. The
The latler peaked in 1992. whereas adverse media
media reports
reports
targeting Domtar peaked in 199
L and then declined each year
1991.
year until
until [994/95.
199.+/95,
when the number stabilized at
al only (Wo
(WO adverse
adverse reports per
per year.
year.
Domtar's lowest level of disclosure was in 1991.
1991 the
th year in which
\ hich the
the
number of company-specific
sit
company-sp cillc media reports.
dealing primarily with
reports, dealing
with site
contamination.
contamination, was
wa' the highest. Mandatory GAAP disclo 'ure resulted
reo uiled 1'1'0111
from this
this
site contamination matter. Domlar's
Domtar"s highest
highe t level of disclosure
disclosure was in
in 1995.
1995. the
the
year in whIch
which the quantity of both industry-relaled
indu try-related and
and company-specilic
company-specific
reports were lowest. For Dornlar.
Domlar. no discernible pattern was
wa, observed
observed between
between
disclosure and adverse media reports.
rcports.

Cross-case comparison. MB. in the throes of a legitimacy
legitimacy crisis.
crisis. reacted far
far
more intensely than Domtar to the number of adverse
adverse media
media repol1s.
reports. hy
by
increasing the quantity or
of its environmental disclosure substantially.
substantially, and
and Ihen
then

30
20
10

o
1991

1992

D
II

1993

1994

1995

No. of Company Media Reports
No. of Industry Media Reports
No. of Pages of Disclosure

Fig. I. MB: Patterns of Reports and Disclosures.
Disclosure,.

decreasing
de
TeaSing it slowly as the fuss waned. When comparing their worst years
(1993 for MB vs. 1991 for Domtar), MB received 85% more adverse press
coverage than Domtar.
Damta/'.
In its
it, voluntary disclosure, MB reacted to its own problems, which
ev n exceeded, the major industry-related legitimacy
overlapped with, and even
problems. For Domtar, industry-related media attacks exceeded company
. pecinc attacks
attack. throughout the period. Its responses were directed toward these
specific
attacks. Its voluntary environmental di
closure does not appear
industry-related aHacks.
disclosure
to be positively related to company-specific adverse media reports.
10
Industry legitimacy problems were imposed on individual companies. For
threat. of an international boycott of'
of all
aJJ Canadian forest products
example, threats
be aus o(f perceived unsustainable industry logging practices affected Domtar.
because
Domlar's focus on industry-related problems in its disclosure
disclosure..
This explains Domtar's
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Fig. 2. DOlnlar:
Dorntar: Patterns of Reports and Disclosures
Disclosures.

RespoJlse
Respo/lse {()
10 Socieral
So i ral Norms
Norll/s and
alld Vall/f:'s
\laille

MacMillall
Bloedel (Fig. 3
3).J. I'yJB
\118 moved
mo ed progressively
progreso ively toward responding 10 an
MacMillaJl Blued,,1
.oci t:-ll norms and values. As Fi)..:.
Fi~~. 3
increasing number of categories of socielal
uggest·. MB was 'coerced' by societal demands
d mands and t:Xpectations
expectations into
suggests.
i omorphic over time.
time
becoming more isomorphic
DOlnlar
Domtar was more ul1Jform
(1992 through 1995) in its
ulllform (199~
DOIl1!Clr (Fig. 4). Domlar
values, thus reqUiring
reqUlrin o less so
sO'letal
response to societal norms and values.
letal coercion
II1creased slate
state of
ot' isomorphism,
isomorphism. All categories of
dis losure not
or disclosure
toward an Increased
responded to related to the company's biggest legitimacy
lcaitlillacy prohlem.
problem. wood
WO(\l!
efAuents and contaminated siles,
sites.
preservative effluents
Further investigation revealed Ihal
that site restoration
re toration issues
issu's were dealt with in
reports, as required hy
by Canadian
anadian GAAP,
GAAP.
the mandatory sections of the annual reports.
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FiR.
\{~aclions 10
J. MB: Reactions
to Norms and Values.
Fig. J,

Therefore, this i.issue
sue was not ignored by Domtar. Mandatory disclosure is
beyond Ihe
the scope of Ihis
thi study, as Ihe
the purpose is to explain voluntarY
voluntary
heyond
environmental disclosure. But, for comparability purposes, the calculations of
uf
reo ponse ratcs
rates were amended to include this mandatory disclosure. The 1993
response
ro e from 71 % to 86%, and 1994 and 1995 rates both rose from
response rat
rate rose
83% to 100%. Overall, Domtar responded to the majority of the nOt-ms
norms and
categorie on a consistent basis over time, suggesting a high level
level of
values categories
isomorphism.
i.omorphism.

Cmss-cuse
eross- 'use comparison. MB progressed toward an improved response rate
during the live-year
five-year period. Domtar was generally more consistent in its
response to societal norms and values throughout
throughoLlt the period, with a better
overall response to categories of norms and values.

1991

1992

D

II

1993

1994

1995

Max. Norms & Values Categories
Categories�
No. of Categories Responded To
To�

FiR.
Fig. 4. Dorntar:
Domtar: Reactions to Norms and Values.

RespolISl?
Re. pOllse to
fo Ar!l'erSI?
Ac!J'erse Media Reports
MacMillan Bloedel (Fig. 5). The results support the prevalence of the annual
annual
report as a corporate communications
communication. vehicle. Annual reports were extensively
used
report. for both industry-related and
u.
ed to respond to adverse media reports
is ues. This was particularly true for \993.
1993, when the
the
company-specific issues.
97% to indusu'y
response rate was 97O/i.
1OO~ to company-specific
industry reports and 100%
reports. On average, MB responded to 88% of the adverse media reports over
the five-year period.

Domtar
Domlar

(Fig. 6). This chart
chan also provides evidence of prevalent
prevalent use of the
the
percentage
annual report for corporate communications. For Domtar.
the
Domlar, the percentage
response rate was particularly high for industry-related news
with an
new.' reports.
reports, with
average response rate of 90%. For company-re1<lted
company-related reports, the average
rales for Domtar's worst year, \991,
response rate was 75%. The rates
were 8\
81 (1/(1
Y(l and
1991, were
74%, respectively. The number of company-specific reports dwindled each
year, from a high of 27 in 1991 to two in 1995. Although Domtar did not
include a response to the two company-specific media reports in its 1995
voluntary environmental disclosure,
disclosure. the issue was addressed in its mandatory
disclosure. ]ndustry-relalcd
Industry-related reports also decreased from
frolll 1993 through 1995.
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Fig. 6.
tJ. Domtar: Response to Current Year Adverse Media R~ports.
Rc'ports.

Cross-case
('ros,l-cuse comparison..
compurison. While MB had a high response to both industry and
company-related
l'()mpany-rclated reports, Domtar's focus was on th~
the industry. The high
industry response rates were comparable (88% overall for MB vs. 9Wlr
9(Y;, for
Domtar). This is intuitively appealing, as a boycott of Canadian products would
l)ol11lar).
have an adver.e
adverse effect on both companies. There was a difference in company
related response rates because MB had a more severe legitimacy issue.
rdated
Response to legiTimacy
/egirimacy gaps
MacMillan
Bloedel (Fig
(Fig. 7). MB displayed a high response ratl'
ratc for both
M{/('Mil/ul1 R/ol'del
industry
Industry and company-related gaps. As legitimacy gaps were directly derived
I'rOI11 adverse media reports,
I"rom
reports. the response rate to legitimacy gaps, although not
as
a. the response rate for the actual reports.
reports, wi 11II share the comments that
us high as
were made in the preceding subsection. The explanation for these lower (but
nonetheless mutcriu])
material) response rates is that, often, many reports rdated
JJonethcless
related to a
single
ponse to one serious
"erious gap boosted the numher of media reports
singll' gap. A re
response
that the company responded to. Conversely, a single report
repon would also produce
(Jap, to which the company may not have
.\a gap.
havt' responded because it was not
considered threatenlllg.
Non-respon. e to this type of gap had more
morc of an impact
thr·calenmg. Non-response
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1995

Fig.
Fig. 7. MR:
MB: Response
Respollc'e to L~gitimacy
Legitimacy (iaps.
Gaps.

on response-to-gap percentages lhan
than on response-to-media
response-lo-media percenl<ll;es,
percentages,
becJUse of the lower denominator used
used in
in tl1('
response-to-gap percental;e
becuuse
the response-to-gap
percentage
calculations. The response rate to both
industry-related and
company-speci fic
both inJustry-reiated
and company-specilic
legitimacy gaps was highest in 199:\,
1993, the
the year of
of the
the most
most intense
intense MB-speeific
MB-specific
criticism. The average response
respon e rate
rate over
over the five-year
five-year period
period for
for each
each was
was
993. when
equal at T\Cfc.
7."1,%. The response was highest in
in MB's
MB's worst
worst year,
year, j1993,
when the
the
86% and 84°1<
84% rC'spectively.
respectively.
rates were 86Cfu
Domtar
Domlar (Fig
(Fig. 8). The legitimacy gaps were
were JeriveJ
derived from
from media
media reports.
reports. The
The
responses
'ponses rates, although less
les, than
than for
for the
the actual
actual reports,
reports, share
shure the
the same
same
re
media reports.
reports, The
ex.planation Cor
for lhe
the
comments as the subsection on news meJia
The explanation
lower response rates was given in the MB
MB case,
case, and
and will
will not
not be
be dupJica1l:d
duplicated here.
here.
Domtar's average response rate of 58% for
for industry-related
industry-related gaps
gaps was
was higher
higher
than
9l) I ,
the raIl'
rate for
for company-specific
company-specific reports,
reports, which
which was
was 44 jJ(ic.
%. The
The raIl'S
rates ror
ror J1991,
than the
0
Domtar's
k and
Domtar's worst
worst year,
year, were
were 50
50%
and 46%
46% respectively.
respectively.
Cross-case
Cross-case rOl11parison.
comparison. While
While MB
MB had
had aa high
high response
response 10
to bOlh
both industry
industry and
and
company-related reports,
company-related
reporls, Domtar
Dorntar focused
focused more
more on
on the
the industry.
industry. This
This isis
consistent with
consistent
with the
the findings
findings in
in the
the previous
prcvivus subsection.
ubsection. The
The difference
difference in
in
comrany-related
because MB
MB had
had aa more
more severe
severe legitimacy
legitimacy
company-related response
response ratt's
rates was
was because
problem
problem than
than Domtar.
Domtar.
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R. Durntar:
DUllllar: Response to Legitimacy Gaps.

Tvpn of .)',
.)',ratcR
ratcR ics
Slratcgics
MorMillon Bloedel ([(ible
MucMillan
(Table .Jj and Fig. 9). Sub:;tantive,
Substantive, concrete strategies
strategie' are
generally more desirable to the relevant publics, while companies tend to favor
more co,;t-dfectivc
cost-effective symbolic assurances. For MB, over the period of the study,
the mix between these two categories of strategies was almost reversed, from
33%
to 63Cft
63 v/t in 1995, and 67% symbolic in 1991 to 37o/r
37%
TV/; substantive in 1991 10
in 1995.
There was a shift toward more SOCially desirable strategies, indicating
199.') Then;
actual changes in corrorate hehavior. This pattern fits
hts into the legitimacy theory
aClual
framewlll'k,
franwwork, with societal pressure resulting in concrete action,
action. as the company
changed to conform to societal demands and expectations. This indicates a
mOt'e isomorphic over time.
general trend toward becoming more
In the substantive category, MB used role performance 144 times and
CO('I'CII'(' i.\o/llorphisl/l
CO('ITIVe
i.\"(I//wrrhislII once. The usc
use of the rolf!
role performance strategy showed
an impressive Incredse
Increase in 1993, compared with 1991 and 1992. This coincided
with the
that MB and the industry were
Ihe barrage of adverse media reports thaI
11)93. Isomorphism was again evident in the increase from 38
subjected to in 1993.
J 993 to 55 in 1995 _ M
B did nOI
on
subslant ivc rl'sponses
substantive
responses in 1993
MB
not attempt to report
repon un
Ihe usc
the
use o(
of the most difticull
difficult strategy of all.
aiL namely, that of trying to aller
alter
sociall.\"
il/stitllliolla/i::.ed practices.
so"iully i//slillilio//{/!i:l'd
praclices,
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Slralcgics.

MB used eight out of a possible nine syml1l)lic
symhl)lic strategies. The mo
mostt widely
espousin~ s(wially
socially acceptable Roals.
used symbolic strategy was that of espousing
goals.
Overall, it was used 45 times out of a total symbolic strategy usage of 140.
l40. Its
use wa.'
was particularly pronounced in 1993, the year In
In which adverse company
rrelated
lated news media reports peaked and MB's quantity of environmental
disclosure surged in defense of its legitimacy. The other two symbolic
strategies that enjoyed considerable usage,
usage. were offering accounts and
adJllission
admission of
uf" guilt. Each was used 26 times. The admission of guilt strategy
started modestly in 1993, and then made
macle its presence felt in 1994 and 1995,
J 995, as
MB
became more attuned to societal expectations. The oftpring
M
B hecame
ofjpring of apologies
was the one symbolic strategy that was not in MB's arsenal. From an
accounting per.
pective, the most disturbing strategy was misrepresentation (for
perspective,
th
wOrst example, see Appendix C).
the worst

Domtnr (Tahle 3J Clnd
fa). For Domtar, the mix between strategies
DOli/far
and Fig. 10).
changed,
from 92%
92 Yo substantive
, ubstantive in 1991 to 79% in 1995.
1995, and 8% symholic in
changed. fraln
1991 to 21 % in 1995. This fits the legitimacy theory framework, with societal
ulting in more concrete action, as the company changed to
pressure III
10 1991 re
resulting
conform to environmental
environm tllal demands and expectations.
expectatiDns. As the company itself
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Fig.
FiR. 10. Domtar:
norntar: Mix of Strategies.
Stratl'gics.

st.rategies shirtt:d
shifted to
t.o providt:
provide more
was targeted less and less, so the mix of strategies
use of substantive stratq,>:ics
strulegivs
symbolic assurances. However,
Howevt:r, the predominant usc
over this extended period indicates attempts at becoming isomorphic With its
performance 99
coereil'e
societal environment. Domtar used role perji)Jmlll/ce
YY times, Ci!CrCil'C
altering sociaflv
socially institutiOlwfi;::ed
institutionalized pwcticl!S
practices once.
isomorphism twice and alterinK
Domtar made sparing use of symbolic strategies.
strategies, using only thrcl'
three typtS
types out of
possible nint
nine over
the five-year
five-y ar pL:riod.
period. The most frequently
a possibk
OVL:r thc
fn:yucntly used symbolic
acceptable goals. It was used 16 times out or
of
strategy was espousing socially
sociaf!.\; acceptahle
symbolic
symbolic strategies used were
a total symbol
ic strategy usage of 20. The other symholic
offering accounts (three times) and ceremonial (·onjormity
conjcJrmi()' (once).
oflnil1f!,
MB, caught unawares in the throes of a legitimacy
Cross-case comparison. MS,
crisIs, used a wide variety of symbolic strategies. Lvidenccd
Evidenced hy
by the use of all
criSIS.
strat.egies, including misrepresenfatiol1,
misrepresentation, societal
but one of the symbolic strategies,
demands forced MB into portraying a higher degree of isomorphism. This was
-trategies,
confirmed by the increased propensity toward disclosing substantive strategies,
which replaced the symbolic, over the five-year
tive-year period. This is also conslstenl
consistent
with Laughlin's (1991) writings. The bigger the exogenous shock, the greater
the possibility of a change to an organization's core philosophie
philosophies., which in turn
leads to substantive change.

In contrast, Donltar\
Domtar's reactions are reflected
reflected by
by extensive
extensive use
use of
of role
role
perJemnance
from
J
991
onwards.
In
1991,
92%
of
the
strategies
disclosed
were
perfC)FlnanCe fronl 1991
920/0 of the strategies disclosed \vere
substantive, exhibiting changes in its behavior
behavior toward
toward the
the natural
natural enVir0l11nent.
environment.
From 1992 to 1994, this declined to between
between 83%
83% and
and 850/0.
85%. In
In 1995,
1995, itit was
was
79 % . As Domtar confornled
79'10.
conformed to societal expectations
expectations and
and becalne
became 1110re
more
strategies, although
although substantial
substantial \vhen
isomorphic,
when
iS0I110rphic, its reported use of substantive strategies,
conlpared to MB, decreased progressively. Donltar
compared
Domtar only
only used
used three
three types
types of
of
sylnbolic strategies. WIB
symbolic
MB used eight.
Domtar's reactions to societal delllands
demands were
were Inore
more responsive
responsive and
and tangible
tangible
Domtar Blade
made use of substantive
substantive strategies
strategies earlier
earlier and
and lnore
more
than MB's, because D0I11tar
majority of D0111tar's
frequently than MB. The 111ajority
Domtar's strategies
strategies were
were substantive
substantive in
in
J 991, which is indicative of the cOlnpany's
company's attelllpts
attempts to
to becolne
become rnore
more
1991,
isol11orphic. Thereafter, the use of synlbolic
isomorphic.
symbolic strategies
strategies becalne
became aa little
little 1110re
more
~rhe trend \vas
was reversed in the case
case of
of MB.
MB. Domtar
Domtar also
also used
used fewer
fewer
prevalent. The
varieties of synlbolic
symbolic strategies than MB. It had
had aa I110re
more concrete
concrete approach
approach to
to
Jegi tin1ation, in contrast to MB's appearance
appearance of
of symbolical.ly
responding [0
to its
its
legitimation,
symbolically responding
crisis in a state of panic or disarray.

LIMITATIONS
liI11itations warrant 1l1ention.
Several limitations
mention. First, the
the study
study is
is litnited
limited to
to voluntary
voluntary
enVirOnl1lenta]
disclosure
in
annual
reports.
Mandatory
disclosure
is
excluded,
environmental
Mandatory disclosure is excluded,
because it falls outside the scope of the research
research question.
question. Second,
Second, the
the authors
authors
recognize that CSD can be Illade
via
COJll111Unication
111edia
other
made
communication media other than
than the
the
annual report (e.g. filings with security C0I11Inissions,
commissions, conlpany
company ne\vsJetters,
newsletters,
press releases,
releases" paid ne\vs
media advertising~
advertising, and
and brochures).
brochures). Fronl
From an
an
news n1edia
accounting perspective, an explanation is
specifically
being
sought
is specifically being sought for
for
voluntary environmental
environn1cntal disclosure
voluntary
disclosure in
in annual
annual reports.
reports. Therefore,
Therefore, this
this study
study isis
lilnilecl
to
annual
reports.
Third,
this
study
is
limited
to
recorded
Canadian
Jimited to annual reports. Third, this study is limited to recorded Canadian
nonDS and
and val
ues. It
It was
not possible
possible to
to control
control for
for the
the effects
effects of
of the
the societal
societal
norms
values.
was not
110rrns
and values
norms and
values of
major export
of I11ajor
export clients
clients and
and international
international business
business associates
associates
of the
the corporations
corporations under
of
under investigation.
investigation. Fourth,
Fourth, conclusions
conclusions could
could not
not be
be drawn
drawn
about the
the use
about
use of
of the
the concealn-lent
concealment Jegitilnation
legitimation strategy.
strategy. If
If use
use of
of the
the
concealrnenf strategy
concealment
involved non-disclosure,
non-disclosure, itit would
would not
not have
have been
been detected,
detected,
strategy involved
as the
the legitimacy
legitin1acy gaps
as
gaps and
and ne\vs
news reports
reports to
to which
which the
the cOll1panies
companies did
did not
not
voluntarily respond
or an
an
voluntarily
respond could
could have
have been
been dealt
dealt with
with via
via Inandatory
mandatory disclosure
disclosure or
alternative C0l11111Unication
alternative
communication 11ledium.
medium. Fifth,
Fifth, this
this study
study was
was not
not designed
designed to
to detect
detect
specific instances
instances of
of nlinlicry
mimicry of
of the
the environrnental
environmental disclosure
disclosure of
of other
other
specific
organizations. Any
organizations.
Any of
of the
the itenls
items or
or disclosure
disclosure could
could have
have resulted
resulted fronl
from rnilnicry,
mimicry,

but the results shovv'
show that adverse I11edia
media reports \vould
would have preceded any
111ilnicry
mimicry that 111ay
may have occurred.

CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The purpose of this study was to exal11ine
examine the potential for legit.inlacy
legitimacy theory as
an explanation for voluntary environnlental
environmental disclosure in the annual reports of
c0I11panies.
companies. The hypothesis was tested on t\VO
two cases and cross-case conclusions
were developed. For each case, the results were consistent with the hypothesis.
There were two 11lain
main reasons for the differences in t.he
the trends found for the t\\lO
two

conlpanies.
compames.
MB found itself in the throes of a nlajor
major legitil11acy
legitimacy crisis. It appeared to be
unprepared for the severity of the Clayoquot Sound-based attacks on its
legitiInacy,
legitimacy, which had the potential to 111aterially
materially affect its financial condit.ion,
condition,
earnings, liquidity and ultin1ate
ultimate survival. Because c0l11pany-specific
company-specific adverse
111edia
media reports exceeded those directed at the industry, MB concentrated on
warding off direct legiti111acy
legitimacy attacks.
D0111tar's
Domtar's 111ajor
major problen1
problem was site cont&.lIninatiol1,
contamination, resulting fronl
from the use of
wood preservatives at its old plants. Although it experienced attacks fron1
from
within the C0I111TIUnities
communities in which these plants were situated, future clean-up
costs were not expected to have an adverse or 111aterial
Domtar's
material effect on D0111tar's
future financial condition, earnings or liquidity. A far greater threat to D0111tar
Domtar
\vas
was an industry-related problenl,
problem, the call for an international boycott of
Canadian forest products. Industry-related adverse 111edia
media reporls
reports exceeded
c0111pany-specific
company-specific reports. Consequently, Dotntar
Domtar put Inore
more etTort into respond
ing 10
to industry-related legitinlacy
legitimacy issues.
The second reason for the difference in trends \vas
was that D0l11tar's
Domtar's 111ain
main
legiti111acy
problelTI,
site
contaruination,
was
111andatory
disclosure
subject
to
legitimacy problem,
contamination,
mandatory
requirenlents.
requirements. The findjngs
findings provide the following directions for future
research:
To provide quantitative enlpirical
empirical support for legitin1acy
legitimacy theory as an
explanation for environlnental
environmental disclosure, researchers could test whether the
quantity (lneasured
(measured by nU111ber
number of pages of disclosure) and quality (nleasured
(measured
by substantive as opposed to sYlTIbolic
symbolic strategies) of disclosure are positively
related to the nlagnitude
magnitude (nleasured
(measured by nU111ber
number of adverse 111edia
media reporls)
reports) of aa
cOlllpany's
company's legitinlacy
legitimacy gaps.
Use the hypothesis and research design in this study to investigate an
organization that is perceived to be a 'green' J11arket
market leader in its industry with
regard to environnlental
environmental disclosure.

Other suggestions for future research, which have a broader focus and
legitimacy
with
integrate legi
[irnacy wi
th other social theories are (1) the incorporation of
classical
perspectives
cJ
8ssical political economy theory perspecti
yes and stakeholder theory into the
suggested framework, as suggested by Gray et al.
a!. (1995a),
(199Sa), and (2) the lIse
use of
examine the
legitimation is an integral part, to exan1ine
structuration theory, of which legitilnation
lnanagernent
management process behind the init.iation
initiation of environlnental
environmental disclosure (see
Buhr, 1997). A particularly interesting case for this would be MacMillan
Bloedel.
A final suggestion for future research is to use a ITIulti-case
multi-case research design
to invesligale
investigate other issues of concern to society, for exan1ple,
example, an exalnination
examination
of the annual report disclosure of the gun and enterlainu1enl
entertainment industries in
reaction to the recent school shootings in Anlerica.
America.
This research resulted in three inlportant
important contributions. First, news n1edia
media
reports were used as a 111eaSUre
measure of organizational legiliInacy.
legitimacy. Second, three
additional legitirnation
legitimation strategies were identified. Third, a research design was
presented that provides a structure for the identification of particular types of
legitinlation
989)
legitimation strategies used by companies in their annual reports. Yin's (]
(1989)
we]
l-establ ished case study research design was used in an innovative ll1anner,
weJl-established
manner,
thereby paving the way for replication by other accounting researchers.

NOTES
I. This paper steins
stems frolll
from the lead author's doctoral dissertation at the University of
Port Elizabeth. Prior versions were presented at the 1999 An1erican
American Accounting
Association Midwest Regional and National Meetings.
2. Equivalent to H,abennasian
Habermasian accounting scholar Laughlin's (199])
(1991) 111orphogenetic
morphogenetic
change.
3. Equivalent to Laughl
in's (1991) rnorphostatic
Laughlin's
morphostatic change.
4. Those involving extensive public participation~
participation, such as the Green Plan,
Sustainable Forests: A Canadian ConlIl1itnlent,
Commitment, Partners in Sustainable Developlnenl
Development of
Forests, ane!
anel the Forest Practices Code of British COlulllbia.
Columbia.
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CATEGORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL�
APPENDIX A. CAr-fEGORIES
ENVIRONMENTAI--,
DISCLOSURE�
DISCLOSURE
( 1)� Environnlental
Environmental Policy
(1)
Environmental Managelnent
Management Systenl
System (EMS)
(2) Environll1ental
Management --� General (specifics under spills,
(3) Risk Managenlent
spi lls, emissions,
enlissions, emuents,
e111uents,
contamination)
land contanlination)
Environmental Auditing
(4) Environlnental
(5) Goals and Targets
Compliance� - Court-related or General (specifics under spills,
(6) Legal Conlpliance
emissions, effluents,
emuents, land contalnination)
contamination)
enlissions,
(7)� Other Managelnent
Management and Systell1
System Disclosure
(7)
Contamination and Renlediation
Remediation
(8) Land Contalnination
(9) Habitats
(10) Wastes
(11)� Air Enlissions
Emissions
(11)
(12) Water Effluents
(13) Spills
(14)� Noise and Odours (other than where odours relate to categories II
(14)
1 1 or
12)

(I
S)
(15)
( 16)
( 17)
(17)
(18)

Product Stewardship
Environlnental Spending
Environmental
EnvironnlentaJ Cost Accounting
Environmental
Sustainable
Sustai
nable Development Reporting

Sources: Buhr & FreedlTIan
Sources
Freedman (1996); United Nations (1994).

APPENI)IX
APPENDIX B. GUIDELINES FOR CODING
T'he
The Context
Con/ext qf
of rhe
[he Coding

'Three decision rules will be used (Buhr, 1994, 346):
Three
en vi ronmen/a/ report \vill
will be considered environn1ental
environmental
((I)
I)� Everything in the envirOlll11ental
disclosure other than the following: Infornlation
Information about the cornpany,
company, 110n
non
environrnental C0I1111lunity
environmental
community interaction, and health and safety lllatters
matters not
not
environmental actions of the conlpany.
company.
directly related to the environnlental
(2) For special sections in annual reports that are clearly devoted to
to
(2)�
environnlentaJ reporting, everything \vill
environmental
will be considered environrnental
environmental
disclosure other than: Infornlation
Information about the conlpany,
company, non-environnlental
non-environmental
c0l11nlunity interaction, and health and safety Inatters
community
matters not directly related
related to
to
environmental actions of the c0l11pany.
company.
the environnlental
(3) Where the above two decision rules are irrelevant,
irrelevant. the unit of context will
wi]]
(3)�
sentence,
be the section heading, subsection heading, paragraph or sentence,
whichever is the Bl0St
most applicable.
1J~fornlation
Information

to be Coded

All text \vill
will be coded. This includes headings, graphs, explanatory illustrations
illustrations
impact of the accolnpanying
accompanying text would be lost), and
and
(without which the inlpact
captions for photographs, but not the photographs thenlselves.
themselves. Infornlation
Information
types that \vil.l
will be excluded fronl
from coding are: Tables of contents, gJossaries,
glossaries,
corporate directories, references to other available publications, user response
response
cards enclosed with or attached to reports, and infornlation
information regarding the
the
production of the report, a COlnnl0n
common exanlple
example being along the lines of "This
"This
report was printed on recycled paper" (Bllhr~
347-348).
(Buhr, 1994,
1994,347-348).
jJroced[{}<es./or l?ec.'ording
Procedures./or
Recording J}~forn].{[tj()n
Information on
on Worksheet
Worksheet

rrhis section
section
This
\\Jhich
which 11111St
must

sets
sets out
out the
the procedures
procedures for
for the
the actual
actual coding
coding process,
process, the
the results
results of
of
be recorded on the worksheet (not reproduced here, but available
available

upon request).
will be cOIllplered
completed for each of the 1991 to
request) ..A
A. separate worksheet
vvorksheet \vill
1995 financial years for each company.
follows:
conlpany. The procedures are as follo\vs:
(I)�
(1) Environmental
Environnlental disclosure in the annual report, and in any other publication
refelTed to in the annual report, \vi11
will be identified, by taking cognizance of
the three decision rules, the key ternlS
terms identified by Buhr (1994,
(1994,323-334),
323-334),
and the categories and subcategories identified in Appendix A. This
disclosure will
\vill be broken down
do\vn into the various categories identified on the
worksheet (to distinguish bet\veen
between voluntary and ll1andatory
mandatory disclosure and
of the
to provide a framework
franlework for the data analysis), and the location or
information
column provided for this purpose.
inforlllation will
\vill be specified in the colU1l1n
(2)�
(2) Quantity of disclosure, reflected in proportions of pages of a standard
letter-sized page (to the nearest 1I (fo
(70 of a page) \-vill
will be sho\vn
shown per
subcategory. These measurements
I11eaSUren1cnts will be taken by using a transparent grid
margins all round, along the lines of the Gray et aI.
a1.
with standard one inch 111argins
study (1995b, 84). Each block of the grid represents 1I % of a page of text.
These measurements
number of
n1easurenlenls will then be aggregated to obtain a total nun1ber
pages of disclosure per year for each cOlnpany.
company.
O~-, LEGITIMACY GAPS AND
APPENDIX C: EXAMPLES OF
CORRESPONDING LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES

Legitinlalion strategies are shown in (italics).
Legitimation
(italics).�
nUlllber of l11edia
The year and number
media reports giving rise to each gap are shown in
111�
[brackets] .�
EXQlnple
Example 1I

environnlental report (p. 1)
MB's 1993 environmental
I) states its desire to be accountable,
\\Jorthy of the public trust, a leader in the forest C0l11111unity,
worthy
community, and says that it
vvelcon1es eco-Iabeling (espousing socially acceptable goals). MB also
welcomes
disclosed details of actual 1110difications
modifications to nlill
mill processes and the installation
of new
ne\v effluent
effi uent treatment
treat111ent systems,
systenls, to conlply
comply with new regulations and
standards (role pe'~lorJnance).
perj'ormance).
This was in response to the following legitilnacy
legitimacy gaps:
ilnage is deteriorating because of its lack of concern for the
MB's public image
environlnent [1991-3;
[1991-3 ~ 1992-2;
1992-2~ 1993-1
OJ ~ it has a large nun1ber
environment
1993-10];
number of crinlinal
criminal
convictions [1993-2] and charges pending r1993-1]
[1993-1] for environnlental
environmental
offences; it engages in forestry practices contrary to the public interest
[1993-5] and is guilty of lllisll1anaging
mismanaging British Colunlbian
Columbian (BC) forests under
[1993-5]; its Port Alberni and Powe]]
its control [1993-5J;
PoweJl River pulp Illills
mills are the \vOrSl
worst

mill effluent is polluting Canadian waters
polluters in BC [1992-2]; pulp n1ill
r 1991-6;
] 991-6; 1992-3], discharging highly
highl y toxic waste, including dioxins and furans
l1991-2],
[1991-2], and exceeding levels pennitted
permitted by governlnent
government guidelines and/or
1992-5J;~ MB is unwilling to change its environIllentally
environmentally
regulations [1991-2;
[1991-2~ 1992-5J
unfriendly processes and practices [1991-4; 1992-2; 1993-8J, resulting in the
destruction of forest ecosystems []
991-2~ 1992-1; 1993-2t
[1991-2;
1993-2J; Inarkets
markets are
dernanding
demanding eeo-Iabeling
eco-labeling of forestry products [1993-3J.
[1993-3].

Exanlple
Example 2
MB
\ 1994 annual environmental report (p.
4) specified that it had been
MB's
(p.4)
convicted of only 15 environlnental
offences
in
25 years (Jnisrepresentation),
environmental
(misrepresentation),
but all
violations
were
unintentional
and
the
result
of equiplnent
aJl
equipment breakdown or
hurnan
accounls). In response, Greenpeace alleged, via Inedia
media
human error (offering accounts).
reports, that there had been at least 86 environn1ental
environmental violations. In two
subsequent newspaper reports (Vancouver Sun, April 12, 1995, p. B2, ~MacBlo
'MacBlo
adlnits
admits to 4 lTIOre
more convictions' and Globe & Mail, April 13, 1995 p.B6,
'MacBIo
'MacBlo acknowledges environlnental
environmental convictions'), MB conceded that the
J 994 annual environnlental
environmental report was inaccurate.
This was in response to the following legitilnacy
legitimacy gaps:
MB has a large nUlnber
number of crinlinal
criminal convictions for environmental offences
[1993-2~ 1994-3J
[1993-2;
J994-3J and a large nUJnber
number of charges pending for illegal
J; MB was the worst corporate
environn1ental
environmental activities l1993-1;
[1993-1; 1994-1
1994-1];
ojJender
government guidelines/
olTender in the BC forest industry [1994-1J,
[1994-1 J, violated governlnent
}(l\VS
laws ainled
aimed at safeguarding saln10n
salmon streams and, in some instances, lied by
111isclassifying
misclassifying sa]n10n
salmon strearns
streams to avoid cOlnpliance
compliance [1993-2; 1994-5].

EX{llnple
Example 3
IVIB's
MB's 1994 annual environillental
environmental report (p. 5) discloses a fine of $206,000
(adJnission
(admission ql'guilt)
o{guilr) for 'inadvertently' (offering an account) harvesting tilTIber
timber

outside of approved cut block boundaries in Clayoquot
C1ayoquot Sound. It explains that
the area was designated for potential logging, though final approval had not
been granted (trivializing
(lrivializing the issue). Steps to ilTIprOVe
improve its boundary-n1arking
boundary-marking
Lechniq ue have been taken to reduce the risk of a recurrence (role
technique
peJ}c)rrnance).
per/i)rmance).
This was in response to the following legitin1acy
legitimacy gaps:
MB illegally Jogged
trees
in
the
Clayoquot
Sound rainforest or other parts of
logged
Vancouver Island [1992-1; 1993-2~
1994-4
J
1993-2; 1994-4] and was fined the Jargest
largest aIllount
amount
in Be
history
and
the
n1axiInU111
penalty
under
the
Forest
Act
[1994-2].
BC
maximum

E.\-an1ple
Example 4
MB's 1992 annual report (p.
(p.25)
example of how the cOlllpany's
company's
25) cited an exanlple
environmental
formal regulatory requirenlents.
requirements. It reported
environn1ental actions surpassed for111a1
that higher than usual sun1nler
summer \vater
water ten1peratures
temperatures near its Alberni 111ill
mill
interfered with salIl10n
salmon 1110venlent
movement and spavvning.
spawning. MB, together with govern
government
moved cold \vater
water into the river, assisting the
Illent fisheries and Be Hydro, nloved
upstream (cerenuJnial
(ceremonial co/~fonniry).
conformity).
salmon
salnl0n in completing
cOIllpleting their journey llpstrean1
This was
legitimacy gaps:
\vas in response to the following legitinlacy
Excessive effluent discharges froll1
from the Alberni pulp ll1ill
mill are poisoning or
causing stress to fish
Jish [1991-3;
1992--4];
salmon had died in
[1991-3~ 1992--4
L 100,000 sockeye sahnon
the oxygen-depleted Alberni Inlet in 1990 (1991-1; 1992-1); there has been a
progressive deterioration in water quality since the Alberni pulp 111ill
mill has been
in operation (1991-1).

